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ceed in their underlying effort. His study dictates the con-
clusion that even though the dissenters should be successful
in respect to the Bill of Rights, it is probable their victory
would be only for the day. True, Corwin's history shows
that natural law conceptions may be successfully rejected,
and the complete supremacy of the legislature upheld; for
as his study demonstrates, the English have substantially
done this. But the English have no practice of judicial re-
view at all. The appeal of the unwritten truth has been
consistently strong in our history. Corwin's study will con-
firm for his readers the firm belief that while it may be re-
grettable, natural law will keep bobbing up in some corner
of the American constitutional system no matter how it may
be treated at any given moment. Lawyers are too firmly in-
grained with a faith that they can determine eternal verities
to make it likely that they will stop trying in the face of
setbacks.
John P. Frank-f
STATE CONTROL OF BUSINESS THROUGH CERTIFICATES OF CON-
VENIENCE AND NECESSITY. By Ford P. Hall.* Blooming-
ton: Bureau of Government Research, Department of
Government, Indiana University, 1948. Pp. 154.
This little monograph brings up to date an article Pro-
fessor Hall wrote on Certificateg of Convenience and Neces-
sity almost twenty years ago in the MICHIGAN LAW REvIEw. 1
Like its predecessor, the present study collects and discusses
the statutes, court cases and commission decisions bearing
on the major aspects of state control of business by means
of the certificate of convenience and necessity, an instrument
which is used today for regulating business in every state
but Delaware. A certificate can be roughly defined as a
legislative grant of quasi-monopolistic power to a particular
kind of business. The theory is that public regulation has
been substituted for the competitive forces of the market
place either at the instance of the public or the business it-
self. The theory further is that in return for this grant of
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
* Professor of Government; Head of the Department of Government,
Indiana University.
1. 28 MicH. L. R. 107, 276 (1929) (in two parts).
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power the particular business assumes responsibilities as to
price policy and quantity and quality of operation. The
kinds of business which have so retired from the competitive
economy as to come under certificate control include the
traditional public utilities such as gas and electricity, the
transportation services such as railroads and motor carriers,
and a miscellaneous group, cotton gins and milk producers,
for example, which have little in common with the recognized
public utilities.
Enough of moment has occurred since 1929 when Pro-
fessor Hall's original piece appeared to suggest that a revisit
to the certificate device would uncover some new and valuable
insights into its growth and development. The long depres-
sion of the Thirties which created a depressed market and
excessive competition in many industries induced some states
to extend the use of the certificate to a variety of "non-
utility" businesses such as ice and milk production and
marketing. The Supreme Court's declaration of 1932 in
the New State Ice case2 that such extension of certificate
regulation was a denial of due process was short-lived. Two
years later in the Nebbia case3 New York's control of its
milk industry was held by the same Court not to offend the
Constitution. Since Nebbia state experimentation with certi-
ficate regulation has developed unhampered by federal con-
stitutional objection.
On the federal level the Thirties saw frequent applica-
tion of the certificate device to meet pressing economic
problems. The NRA experimented boldly, though briefly,
with the issuance of certificates to control price and pro-
duction policy in myriad businesses. Congress granted the
Federal Power Commission plenary powers over the inter-
state operations of established electric utilities in 1935, and
three years later the Natural Gas Act gave that Commission
authority to control ingress into the interstate natural gas
business through issuance of certificates of convenience and
necessity. In the same year a charter for regulating air-
lines, keyed to the certificate device, was handed to the
newly created Civil Aeronautics Board. During the same
period Congress vested the Interstate Commerce Commission
-2: New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).,
3. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
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with certificate control over motor carriers (1935) and
water carriers (1940).4
Though it would be an over-simplification to suggest
that excessive competition alone motivated Congress to bring
natural gas pipelines, airplanes, motor carriers, water car-
riers and other businesses under certificate control, this was
indeed one of the important depression-inspired reasons. It
is therefore significant that the federal legislators at the
same time attempted to safeguard against a swing of the
pendulum to the other extreme of monopolistic power. The
Civil Aeronautics Act, for example, includes among the
criteria the CAB is required to consider before issuing a
certificate "competition to the extent necessary to assure
the sound development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States. . . ."5 In carrying out this
declaration of policy the Board has recently recognized that
competition itself may aid in regulating an industry
since "economic regulation alone cannot be relied upon to
take the place of the stimulus which competition provides
in the advancement of technique and service in air trans-
portation."6  To take another illustration, Judge Edgerton
recently upheld the Federal Power Commission's issuance
of a certificate to a natural gas pipeline in an area already
serviced by a large interstate pipeline because "there is
nothing in the Natural Gas Act [to suggest] that Congress
thought monopoly better than competition or one source of
supply better than two, or intended for any reason to give
an existing supplier of natural gas for distribution in a par-
ticular community the privilege of furnishing an increased
4. And during World War II, as Professor Hall points out (at page9), the Office of Defense Transportation issued "certificates of
war necessity" for motor transportation operations and the WarProduction Board issued "necessity certificates" for the construc-
tion of emergency production facilities.
5.- 52 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 U. S. C. § 402 (1946).
6. Colonial Airlines v. Atlantic Seaboard Operation, 4 C. A. B. 552,
555 (1944). The Board has a "duty to protect the air transport
industry against the evils of unrestrained competition on the
one hand, and the adverse consequences of monopolistic control on
the other." Ibid. The struggle the Board has had in steering a
middle course between Scylla and Charybdis on this issue has been
clearly developed in Westwood, Choice of Air Carrer for New
Transport Routes, 16 GEO. WASH. L. R. 1, 159 (1948).
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supply."17 Even the Interstate Commerce Commission, which
antedates the invention of the certificate device, has "recog-
nized the value of reasonable competition" in railroad, motor
carriers and water carrier regulation. 8
In this monograph, however, Professor Hall uncovers
little evidence that state legislatures or commissions have
followed the lead of the Federal Government.9 His study
discloses that they generally apply the same criteria of
financial responsibility, quality of equipment, personal quali-
fications, etc., to determine public convenience and necessity
as they employed in 1929. They either overlook or reject
competition as a possible means of attaining effective control
over a regulated business. Their conception of the certificate
as a grant of outright monopolistic power evidently has not.
been influenced by the federal experience of the last two
decades.1o
Professor Hall's monograph is a painstaking and ex-
haustive collection and discussion of the verbal formulas
applied by the states in granting or denying certificates of
public convenience and necessity. This is a large and proper
task with which we cannot quarrel. But we may hope that
Professor Hall may, as one superbly acquainted with the
field, analyze in another study the basic question of whether
the public is receiving substantial value in return for its
grant of monopoly power to certificate holders. This may
very well call for a comparison of state and federal experi-
ence, particularly in view of the recent torrent of federal
regulatory legislation utilizing the certificate device.
Franklin M. Schultzt
7. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission,
169 F.2d 881, 884 (App. D. C. 1948). In fact, in 1942 Section 7 (g)
was added to the Natural Gas Act, 56 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U. S. C.
§ 717 f (1946), to provide: "Nothing contained in this section shall
be construed as a limitation upon the power of the Commission
to grant certificates of public convenience and necessity for service
of an area already being served by another natural-gas company."
8. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U. S. 515, 532,
n.20 (1946).
9. For Professor Hall's discussion of what little evidence there is,
see pp. 81-83 of the monograph.
10. But see the persuasive argument that the states use competition
as an aid to regulation in Comment, A Re-Examination of Compe-
tition in Gas and Electric Utilities, 50 YALE L. J. 875 (1941). Cf.
BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 168-70 (1942);
TRoxEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 212 (1947).
f Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
Attorney, Bureau of Law, Federal Power Comission, 1946-47.
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